

JointMAG

PERSPECTIVES ON GERMAN-AFRICAN FUTURES

Letter from the editors

Dear readers,

this summer issue is dedicated to the 50th anniversary of independence of many African states. What were the prospects 50 years ago, how is the situation today - and what does the future look like? Authors will present their assessments of the situation in Guinea, Senegal and Somalia. Further, Go Africa alumnus Victor Oteku analyses the present situation in Kenya, and China scholar Gunnar Henrich presents his account of Chinese Africa policy.

Enjoy reading Joint MAG 11!

Dennis Kumetat,
Linda Poppe and
Alexander Schwartz

Guinea-Conakry Facing its Destiny –A political history of Guinea in light of the current presidential elections

by Lisa Stahl, Germany

"This election is a collective victory."

These are the words of General Sekouba Konaté (Sow, Interview, 28/6/2010, Jeune Afrique), president ad interim of the Republic of Guinea, after fulfilling his promise to organise presidential elections within six months of his appointment.

The 27th of July 2010 can indeed be qualified as a collective victory of the people of Guinea, who have voted in what is arguably the first democratic election since the independence of the country in 1958. This notable moment in the history of Guinea could also be a turning point enabling the country to find its way out of 52 years of autocratic rule and oppression.

In general, publications on the political situation of Guinea are scarce, though the country has sporadically been the subject of world media headlines since the riots of 2007 until the elections of today. The last 52 years of Guinea's history contrast starkly with the beginnings of the Republic. Having been a French colony, Guinea was offered to become part of the French Union ("Union Française" – created in 1946 and replaced by the "French Community" in 1958 by President De Gaulle – see historic background) regrouping former French colonies to maintain a close relationship with France. However, when Guinea became independent in 1958, two years before all other French colonies in Africa, it also became the only former French colony to turn away from France and strive to grow on its own. Ahmed Sékou Touré, the first president of Guinea, became famous for replying to the French offer to join the French Community: "There is no dignity without liberty [...]. We prefer poverty in liberty to prosperity in slavery".

Unfortunately, after independence, Guineans not only stayed poor in comparison to some of their neighbours, but also suffered from two totalitarian regimes, severely limiting their fundamental freedoms. Sékou Touré is often cited with other African dictators such as Idi Amin Dada, Mobutu Sese Seko or Jean-Bedel Bokassa. When Sékou Touré died after 26 years in power, General Lansana Conté took control. His reign was not very different from that of his predecessor, marked by regular riots and violent oppression. Although he is depicted as more democratically-oriented than Sékou Touré, Conté used violence against his opponents to stay in power. During Conté's rule Guineans therefore became masters in the art of opposing the government by indirect means, such as the method of so-called "villes mortes" ("dead cities"), where all citizens of a city stop all activities and stay at home in sign of protest.

From 2003 on, the people of Guinea found themselves worrying about the future of their country as the health of President Conté was worsening daily and no one stepping forward to fill the power gap. President Conté's declining health became a threat to the political




system as a whole. The expected struggle for power after Conté's death was making Guinea's future look uncertain and dark, especially as Guinea had managed - unlike its neighbours, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia - not to fall into civil war. When Conté died in December 2008, Moussa Dadis Camara, a young and previously unknown general took power through a non-violent military coup. Despite the fact that the military came into power, for many Guineans Dadis Camara represented the hope of a peaceful democratic transition. Unfortunately, Camara's proclaimed democratic aspirations did not last long and he soon presented himself as the central candidate for the future presidential elections, which fuelled the opposition of many Guineans. On September 28th, 2009, leaders of the opposition and civil society activists organised a non-violent demonstration in the stadium of Conakry to protest what they feared would be an autocratic military takeover. During the protest, an estimated 150 Guineans were killed by the military per Dadis Camara's orders. This event was of such brutality that the International Criminal Court has been mandated to investigate this "massacre of the 28th of September".

Following the massacre, Dadis Camara was not only opposed by the population, but also lost support within the military itself. This was a crucial turning point, as the military has always played an important role in Guinean politics and every president has needed the support of the military to stay in power. It was finally the attempted killing of Dadis Camara by one of his adjutants, Aboubacar 'Toumba' Diakité that marked the end of his leadership and opened the door to a democratic transition. Following international pressure, Dadis Camara went into exile to Ouagadougou where he is supposed to stay until the end of the elections.

In January 2010, after various international discussions, General Sékouba Konaté was chosen as interim president, but the actual task of ruling the country was left to an interim government of national unity and its interim Prime Minister Jean-Marie Doré, proposed by the opposition. Sékouba Konaté's involvement in diplomacy and his attempt of reforming the military should, however, not be underestimated, as they were important steps toward the democratic development of Guinea.

Finally, the first round of the presidential elections took place on the 27th of June in a rather peaceful atmosphere. The two winners seeming to emerge from the first round of elections are Fulbe (one of the major ethnic groups of Guinea) politician and former Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo (39,70% of votes - l'Union des Forces démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG)) and the historic opposition leader and Mandinké Alpha Condé (20,67% - Rassemblement du peuple de Guinée (RPG)). The third place was awarded to the Diakanké and also former Prime Minister Sidya Touré (15,60% - l'Union des forces républicaines (UFR)), who claims that his party is regrouping all ethnic communities of Guinea.



The presidential elections demonstrated that the ethnic factor does play an important role in politics in Guinea, with each of the candidates representing his regional base: Cellou Dalein Diallo's base is the Fulbe community, which represents 40% of Guinea's population. Many members of the Fulbe community think that it is now time to have a Fulbe President, as Sékou Touré was a Mandinké, the second largest ethnic group in Guinea, and Lansana Conté a Sousou, the third largest group.

However, this first round of elections is not a guarantee for a long-term democratic transition in Guinea. In order for these elections to become a vehicle for democracy, the results have to be accepted by the 4 million Guinean voters. This is not an easy endeavour, and tensions are palpable. Frauds have been pointed out by voters and the Independent National Electoral

Commission (CENI) has been accused of badly organising the elections. Following the announcement of the election results, Sydia Touré has claimed to have come in second instead of Alpha Condé, and accused his opponent of having committed major election fraud with the help of the CENI and the interim President Konaté. As a result of these criticisms, Sékouba Konaté threatened to step down from his office, but was finally persuaded by politicians and the international community to stay in power in order to guarantee the stability of the country.

Touré has introduced his complaints in front of the Supreme Court, which must investigate all cases before the second round of the elections. Therefore, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) already announced that the second round of elections will not be held on the 18th of July as planned. For now, most Guineans hope that they will be able to elect a legitimate, widely supported president as soon as possible. Although the reactions to the first round and the recent developments have not been as positive as hoped, one should not forget that no society can go through 50 years of civilian and military dictatorship without scars, and that establishing a democratic political culture is a fragile, gradual process. For this process to succeed, the Guinean population needs a justly elected and "good" President who is dedicated to helping them finally harvest the fruits of their long fight for liberty and democracy.

Senegal and the Casamance conflict

by Marvin Kumetat, Germany

Senegal is often hailed as the model pupil of a generally stable democracy in the otherwise crisis-ridden region of Western Africa. Since 1960, it suffered neither a coup d'etat nor military rule: both Leopold Senghor in 1981 and his successor, Abdou Diouf, in 2000 handed over power peacefully. The initial single-party rule of Senghor's Parti Socialiste (PS) was gradually reformed and thus paved the way for a now lively political scene. Due to its high profile in many regional and international

organizations, Senegal participated in many peacekeeping missions and is considered as a stabilizing factor in the region. The radio, some 20 daily newspapers and foreign publications suffer no censorship and the largely unrestricted press climate is a benevolent factor for a successful integration among Western states, too, notably France (due to its former colonial linkages) and the US.

However, Senegal is facing some major problems: for instance the unemployment rate stands at approximately 40%, the mass migration to Europe drains the pool of qualified workforces, the economy struggles to keep up with more efficient EU and Asian competitors, just recently most of the opposition parties boycotted parliamentary elections. And if nothing else, there is Africa's longest running – yet internationally less known – civil conflict about Senegal's southernmost province, the Casamance – a region which differs not only in physical, but also in human geography.

While Senegal celebrates 50 years of independence from French colonial rule this year, the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) - being the only separatist movement in Western Africa - is still striving for an independent Casamance. The movement's separatist ambitions had been triggered by the December 1983 killing of 25 demonstrators in Ziguinchor ('Red Sunday'), but base on several more profound reasons. Looked at from a geographical perspective, the Casamance is the well-watered part of the otherwise semi-arid country with The Gambia almost completely separating the two parts.

Also, the population of the Casamance mainly consists of the Diola which felt marginalised by the 'Northerners' and have little affinity for the Wolof (and vice versa), who represent the predominant ethnic group in Northern Senegal. Thus, the Casamancaises historically have more in common with their neighbours in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. That is why, recently, factions of the MFDC not only formulated their demand for independence but also a possible merger with these two countries who they claim to have been separated from only by the arbitrary colonial era demarcation. A controversial land rights reform in the 1960's along with expropriations and forced displacements did further damage to the strained situation. It is debatable, whether the MFDC's demand is a) justifiable and b) enforceable in terms of national self-determination.

In Africa (unlike in Europe), this concept was mostly overruled in favour of the *uti posseditis* (lat. „as you possess“) principle, simply because the former would have caused major conflicts over the arrangement of the new units. As a result, the formula "one nation = one state" was not fulfilled and ethnic groups or traditional nations were thus forced to live under new nation states. What are the criteria according to which a minority can define themselves as a nation and claim autonomy? Language, religion and race are certainly some of them. As stated above, the Diola are one of the main ethnicities of the Casamance. The Senegalese government even tried to attach the label of an 'affaire Diola' to the conflict and there have been reports that Senegalese forces arrested individuals on the basis of Diola ethnicity alone. However, it would be an oversimplification to characterize the situation as an ethnic conflict – in fact, the Diola represent about 60% of the Casamance population among other groups, such as Malinke, Peul and Manjak.

The same applies to the religious aspect: although the percentage of Christians and animists in the Casamance is notably higher than in the rest of Senegal, 60% of the Diola are Muslim (as are the Wolof). It rather appears that the Senegalese government uses this overly simplistic evaluation of the conflict to establish a grounding from which to attack the movement. Also, it is delicate to decide what prerequisites a movement has to conform to, in order to legitimately claim independence. The MFDC suffers from factionalism and infights and – apart from the apparently unrealizable demand for independence – lacks a clear political strategy. Its violence inflicts mostly on the Casamancaises so that it alienated from the population whose interests it claims to represent. Particularly in the last few years, the harassment of the population experienced an increase.



For instance, armed robbery from the villagers has become a source of revenue for some members of the MFDC along with a immeasurable number of copycats, who interfere from outside and take advantage of the non-presence of the Senegalese forces in some parts of the region. This behaviour has been condemned by the political wing, but it seems as if this has hardly any influence on the trespassers. This raises the question as to who really controls the movement.

In addition, there are human rights abuses and attacks against civilians – all of which further undermine the populations desire to continue its support for the MFDC. Furthermore, it failed to provide the indigenous population with basic services such as health and education and is thus in line with the government's failure to do so in the past. It remains to take a look at the actual feasibility of a possible independence of the Casamance. Despite the movement's political support on the part of The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, the Senegalese government at no time really considered it to be an option. The movement poses no threat to the otherwise well-developed and stable civil society and – as stated above – the MFDC failed to unite the people of Casamance behind it and is thus unable to shoulder any kind of governmental responsibility for the region.

It is now up to Dakar to show some creativity and flexibility in the peace process as there are numerous advantages a reintegration of the Casamancaises into the Senegalese society would offer. It is obvious that the effort to win the battle by military means not only failed but also pushed a considerable amount of disappointed civilians into the hands of the MFDC, which at least gives them the opportunity to take part in the flourishing war economy (e.g. theft, drug trafficking and illicit timber exploitation). It should rather promote social and economic alternatives, especially for the youth as it is them who are to be recruited for the next generation of rebels. Everyone in the region needs to be given reasons to prioritise peace over maintaining the status quo. This is not the case at the moment. Also it is essential to offer those who are already involved in the MFDC a realistic option for laying down arms and elaborate concepts to ensure a peaceful reintegration of these individuals. Additionally, the Casamances geographical condition creates the potential to produce most of Senegal's food needs and is therefore of enormous importance to the national population as a whole. As shown, a lot is at stake. Both sides need to work much harder to find a compromise and be prepared to give up their rigid positions: the Senegalese government needs to seriously investigate (and not dismiss per se) the idea of some degree of autonomy for the Casamance while the MFDC has to abandon the unrealizable demand for independence. It remains to be seen what the future holds for the people of the Casamance.

Kenya's hope for a constitution

by Victor Oteku, Germany

Kenya has been an island of peace since independence in 1963 with minimal tensions. But the saying "where there is smoke there is fire" is true for the young country, which may have lost an opportunity to build a nation. The root cause of Kenyan problems is poor political leadership and political will to turn things around for the sake of their country. From Jomo Kenyatta to Mwai Kibaki today, there are signs of missed opportunities to unite the country. Instead successive governments buoyed by tribal chiefs as political opponents have surrounded themselves by greedy individuals, known as the 'kitchen cabinet', whose main aim is to get power and retain it by pulling strings behind the scenes. These individuals not only own Kenya's wealth, but also have the power to use these riches to tear the country while protecting their interests. While the Kenyan is a peace lover, absolute poverty afflicting half the population, allows for some manipulation.

This is aggravated by the resource allocation with leaders aiming to enrich themselves and reward their constituencies. The hope, however,

lies in a new generation of leaders, the media and the religious community, workers' unions and the civil society. This group can unfortunately be influenced by the political class as has been the case after the 2002 general elections where Mwai Kibaki trounced the KANU candidate Uhuru Kenyatta. This was the year when Kenyans were deemed amongst the most optimistic people in the world. This euphoria however did not last long as the politicians bickered and seemed unwillingness to fulfill their promises to the electorate. Where and when the population was willing to fight tribalism and corruption, the government did not react positively. One major failed promise of the NARC government, for instance, was the delivery of a new constitution in 100 days. Eight years later Kenyans still have the old constitution. Most of the former activists who fought for regime change failed Kenyans by joining in the government either directly or indirectly. But, after a series of discussions there is now a proposed constitution. However, the draft containing excellent clauses that promise to overhaul the whole political, social and economic system is facing stiff opposition from church leaders and a political class with questionable history.

While the stance of some of these leaders is expected, the church's position is surprising. Over the years, churches became the alternative opposition to oppressive leadership in Kenya by contributing to the unity of the Kenyan opposition that ousted the Moi government, which ruled for 24 years. They also led the quest for the deletion of section 2A in the current constitution, which hindered multipartism. They also led fights against corruption and human rights abuses. The Kenyan religious leaders were instrumental in the push for a new constitution as well and have always been a source of comfort and hope for Kenyans. This, however, is slowly changing.

In 2005 the church engaged in divisive politics. A church leader from one community aligned himself with leaders of his community to either reject or support the draft constitution. Those who opposed the constitution won. This opened a can of worms

and the drying wounds of tribalism were scratched leading to further polarization of Kenyans. The results were obvious two years later. Indeed, Kenya is still writhing from the effects of the post

election violence that led to thousands of deaths and displacements and destruction of property. To add insult to injury, those opposing the proposed new constitution have been inciting tribal and religious animosity. The new contentious clauses are no longer the classical executive and devolution clauses which led to the rejection of the Wako draft in 2005. Five years later, church leaders have pitted themselves against their Muslim brothers by opposing a clause allowing for Islamic courts "Kadhi courts" although these already exist and only applies to consenting Muslims and in specific issues like customary law. The next contention is an abortion clause. The proposed new constitution prohibits abortion but allows a pregnant mother's life to be saved with the recommendation of a doctor. The 'church' opposes this despite having succeeded in pushing for the definition of when life begins, that is, at conception, which is now engraved in the constitution to be.

Although the winds of change are stronger than those opposing the harmonised constitution, the margin of difference is thinning. The NO camp (The reds) is visibly better structured than the YES camp (The greens), which has leadership and

by day. These watermelons and some NO leaders have developed what Kenyans call a "Raila phobia". Their main fear is Prime Minister Raila Odinga whose party the Orange Democratic Movement, had in the past proposed a parliamentary and devolved system of governance in the constitution, which was opposed by many and seen as promoting federalism and therefore tribalism. Raila's wish however has been watered down by the proposed new constitution (PNC) which proposes a presidential system with more checks and balances. In this regard his nemesis incorrectly believed he would reject the constitution. To their surprise he was the first to come out in support of the PNC and solidified his position as a presidential hopeful in the next elections. Partly because the President Mwai Kibaki is on the YES side and is trying to leave behind a legacy of success if the constitution is passed, the 'watermelons' fear opposing him directly. Still, there have been numerous attempts to stop the passage of the PNC. These range from parliament's

"There is hope with the passage of the PNC because there will finally be a constitution made by and for

attempt to blockade the process to the finance minister declining to release funds for civic education. There are even cases of threats issued to certain communities not to vote for the constitution at the risk of being killed or driven away from their settlements.

Despite all these attempts to sabotage the process, it has continued and opinion polls predict a win for the greens. This is attributed to the unrelenting campaign from the president who has virtually replaced the prime minister on the campaign trail. Raila Odinga has been the de facto leader of the YES team until recently when he underwent an operation. As he recovers, the president has taken over, organizing rallies in places where the Greens had little support. While the YES secretariat is split between the president's office and the prime minister's office, the YES campaign is getting better by the day. Other political leaders from various parties, the civil society are also supporting the process. Indeed, things are looking up for the largest economy in East Africa. There is hope with the passage of the PNC because there will finally be a constitution made by and for Kenyans. Kenya, however, needs to focus on uniting after the August 4 referendum. Those who will vote against the constitution are still part of the country and should be brought on board during its implementation. The reds have genuine reasons for rejecting the PNC. After its passage their concerns should be addressed to ensure the country moves together in one direction.

A glimpse into the future? Chinese politics towards Africa

by Gunnar Henrich, Germany

In the 1960/70s China supported liberation movements in different African states and provided development assistance to many African regions. After the Chinese isolation in the course of the Tiananmen massacre Beijing started to identify developing countries as the new cornerstone of its foreign policy. Since 1991 it has become a tradition that each newly appointed Chinese minister of foreign affairs visited an African country on his first journey abroad. In November 2006 Beijing held a large Sino-African conference which led to significant and constructive promises regarding large co-operation for 48 African States. The China Africa Cooperation Beijing action plan 2007-2009 officially declared the equality between both partners.

Chinese politics towards Africa is not characterized by development policy in the western sense, but rather a classical policy of interests on the field of geopolitics and trade relations. As a consequence, there is no ministry of development in Beijing. Instead, Chinese Africa policy is coordinated by the departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which, in sum, represent all Chinese interests in the continent. Beijing's contacts to Africa are highly state-controlled: all business contacts are directed through the central government, and, independent groups do not have the possibility to further Sino-African relations. Beijing's goals for Africa are partially unofficial announcements of the Chinese State Department. Thus, co-operation with African states in the United Nations is emphasized likewise military co-operation is. Effectively, China exports its form of economic development by trade and infrastructural investments to its African partners.

The Peoples' Republic also looks back on a long tradition of health diplomacy with African and Middle Eastern states. In 1964, Beijing sent the first medical teams to Africa upon an invitation by the Algerian government and in 2003, Beijing had distributed of 860 medical aides in 35 teams on 34 countries. Components of the health diplomacy are in form of assistance for infrastructure, scholarships of African students to study at Chinese universities as well as the training of African physicians.

All in all, China has sent well over 16,000 physicians and nurses to the continent in the past 50 years. Many Chinese ministries used funds in order to train African personnel. In the year 2003, 6000 African were trained as part of the program. Scholarships were assigned to 1500 African students by Chinese universities. Today,




Chinese truck in Ghana (Image: [oneVillage Initiative, Creative Commons](#)).

these institutions are either direct supporters of the state or they are under a close supervision by the China Africa cooperative forum.

On a different note, the Peoples' Republic regards Africa as one key sales market for its defense industry. Between 1996 and 2003 Chinese weapon sales to Africa ranked second after the Russian Federation.

A further goal of China is to bring the future African elite for training purposes into the People's Republic even if these future African leaders had actually preferred the west. In 2005, approximately 110,000 African students came to China. Those were twice as many as in 2004. At the same time three Confucius Institutes took up their work in Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa. Beijing enabled 80000 Chinese migrants to work in jobs in the food industry in African states. However, these migrants wake African fears that Chinese products would replace the African. Furthermore, one fear is not to reinvest the Chinese profits into the People's Republic but to transfer it to Africa. Africa is the only continent where Chinese enterprises apply for governmental calls and dispatch only Chinese workers. Being a key sales market for China's consumer products, the Peoples' Republic does not only eye the raw materials of the continent, but also its markets: in many African cities cheap dresses from Chinese production inundate local markets. If the western community imposed sanctions on African states, Beijing would be quick to fill the new vacuum. In case of Sudan, China has used this strategy of the footboard on several occasions, as energy security is a key strategy for economic development of the Peoples' Republic. Beijing already imports a quarter of its crude oil and oil derivatives from Africa, thus from Nigeria, Angola, Chad and the Sudan. Particularly the Sudan provides important amounts of oil; half of the Sudanese oil export goes to China. The recent success of China in Africa explains itself by the retreat of the west from its sphere of influence from Sub-Saharan Africa after

the end of the cold war. Likewise, the failure of the African modernization project favors success despite substantial western development assistance of China. The Chinese leadership thus has a strong incentive to modernize and industrialize the African continent according to the Chinese model. How the Chinese engagement in Africa develops in the course of the 21st century remains an open question. However, Africa could be the anvil on which a new Chinese foreign policy will be forged.



The author works towards a PhD on Chinese Africa politics at the Center for Global Studies at Bonn University, Germany.

Buro, 'the dusty': second largest town of Somaliland

Somalia at 50: 'Nation (Still) in Search of a State'

By Dominik Helling, UK

A sign of hope in 'black Africa' was the way the Democratic Republic of Somalia was generally perceived upon gaining independence on July 1st, 1960. This was partly due to its vast ethnic homogeneity and fierce nationalist sentiments, earning it the title of being a 'nation in search of a state'. While five decades down the road of history the label has largely remained the same, the picture has, however, changed significantly. Shattered into regional pieces with divergent developments, ex-Somalia tells an interesting, though tragic, story about the variety of state trajectories in a 'post-conflict' situation. While the following paragraphs cannot look into the how and why of this puzzle, they seek to take a cursory stock of the Somali state and its different developments over the past 50 decades since the end of colonialism.

During the first decade of independence, Somalia was lauded for its exceptional democratic progress. Yet, the political developments got out of hand, culminating in a situation described by some as 'democracy gone mad'. In 1969, Gen. Siyad Barre took power in a military coup d'état and declared to steer the country towards 'scientific socialism'. While the population initially welcomed the regime change, the overall situation worsened in the medium term. The dictatorial regime became increasingly repressive, the country slid into a brutal civil war, by the time that Somalia had already come to be known as a 'graveyard for international aid'. After Siyad Barre was toppled in 1991, a diversity of state trajectories set in.

For one, there is the Republic of Somaliland, which unilaterally declared its independence from the south in 1991. The break-away region is territorially based on the borders of the former British Protectorate, disposing

of its own flag, parliament and army. Thereby, the de facto state has managed to build a reasonable level of peace and stability, even though (or maybe because?) it saw comparatively little foreign involvement, and even though (or, yet again, maybe because?) it has not been internationally recognized to date. While Somaliland can, despite its remarkable developments, not yet been considered constituting a 'resilient state', it elected an opposition leader as its fourth president on June 26, 2010 – exactly fifty years after it had gained its independence from the British Crown.

For another, there is what remains of the Republic of Somalia – contrarily to Somaliland, internationally recognized, but little more than a mere shadow of itself. Since nearly two decades south-central Somalia has not seen an effective government and has reached a point at which Foreign Policy crowned it the most severely 'failed state' for the third year in a row. No longer does the rich agricultural area in the south export sugar and bananas, but headlines about war, pirates, and Islamic fundamentalists. Somalia has come to be at the crosshairs of the 'global war on terror', particularly after Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the twin-bombings in Kampala, Uganda, just some ten days after Somalia's fiftieth anniversary of independence.

In between these two extremes, one finds the autonomous Somali state of Puntland. Since 1998, this north-eastern territory has built somewhat similar structures of governance as Somaliland, but, in the international public, has come to be primarily known for booming piracy business at its coastal waters. With some 135 pirate attacks during 2008 alone, their activity seriously disrupted international trade. While this brought increased media attention back to Somalia and its conflict – leading to the judgement that Somalia constitutes the 'world's most serious humanitarian disaster' – it resulted in addressing symptoms rather than root causes. Thereby, the deployment of an armada

of war ships does neither take the dire situation on-shore, nor the 'other piracy' (in terms of illegal fishing and waste dumping by international trawlers) into account. Given such developments 50 years after independence, what is to become of Somalia? While Somaliland is likely to continue its current path in the 'international offside', the developments in south-central Somalia and their potential international responses are much more worrying. Given the fact that the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) authority is confined to some quarters of Mogadishu, with Al-Shabaab simultaneously carrying out regional terror acts, the international climate is increasingly ripe for a more serious international

Yet, foreign boots in Somalia are not only likely to re-unify and strengthen the partially fragmented fundamentalists, but – as historically proven – will probably also exacerbate the conflict. Rather than rushing towards military action and thus playing into the hands of the extremists, the international community should put pressure on the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to engage in striking political deals that co-opt certain elite actors and key clans. Only once the 'political marketplace' has been exploited and political coalitions been forged, should effective security operations at a larger stage be considered.

Announcement

Partnership Africa: New horizons for EU- and inter-African cooperation

Brussels, 27/09/2010, Bibliothèque Solvay

Annual International Policy Summit organised by Friends of Europe and supported by the Development Policy Forum and the Belgian EU Presidency

UNDER DISCUSSION:

Deepening partnerships in Africa and developing new ones while strengthening good governance and regional integration will be in the spotlight for the first session. Tackling Africa's energy and environment challenges will be debated in the second session. The final session will focus on meeting Africa's infrastructural and human capital needs and healthcare challenges.


WHAT, WHERE & WHEN:

This International Policy Summit will be held at the Bibliothèque Solvay in Brussels on Monday, 27 June from 08.30 to 15.30.

European Commissioner Andris Piebalgs will give a keynote speech opening the summit.

PARTICIPANTS:

We anticipate the participation of several hundred development and Africa's experts from the EU institutions, national governments and agencies of the member states, pan-African institutions and governments of African states, representatives of international organisations, business and industry, civil society, media and press.



Call for Contributions

In the past few month, Europe has seen elections to the European Parliament, the Lisbon treaty has finally come into force and a new Commission has started its work. The European Union is without doubt a succesful example for regional cooperation. We want to have a look at their policy towards Africa - and potential changes in the aftermath of the Lisbon treaty. And even more importantly, the new issue wants to shed light on the maybe lesser known examples of regional cooperation on African soil such as SADC or ECOWAS. Joint Mag 12 will feature analysis and policy briefs, interviews and opinion pieces. Please fell free to contribute to the next issue! Deadline for contribution is 20 August 2010. Please email Ilka at ilkaritter@hotmail.com or to goafrica@bpb.de to express your interests and ideas.

Editors: Alexander Schwartz, Dennis Kumetat, Linda Poppe // Editorial Team: J. Bergmann, M. Gatobu, L. Tsebe, B. Zasche

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